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Abstract: 
This article questions the promotion of reconciliation in transitional justice contexts. The article puts 
forward a critique of reconciliation in practice and questions mainstream definitions of reconciliation. 
The principle that these forms of reconciliation are desirable is also questioned. It is argued that 
examples of genuine reconciliation are difficult to find, that the promotion of reconciliation is 
frequently emphasised at the expense of substantive societal change, that emphasis on reconciliation 
(narrowly defined) risks taking agency away from those affected by conflict and that emphasis on 
reconciliation may obscure injustice and may promote acceptance of the status quo. The article 
suggests that reconciliation is not a necessary condition of, and should be de-emphasised in, 
transitional justice and, if it is promoted at all, that a different, less prescriptive notion of 
reconciliation is necessary. 
Keywords: reconciliation; forgiveness; social change; transformative justice; transitional justice; 
victim agency. 
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A Future Without Forgiveness: Beyond Reconciliation in Transitional Justice 
Introduction 
Transitional justice is a concept and a set of theories, ideas and practices, which has over the 
course of several decades come to occupy a prominent position in international politics. 
Along with the (at times) overlapping notion of peacebuilding, the toolkit of transitional 
justice is frequently drawn upon by local and international actors (state and non-state) making 
interventions into political, social and legal responses to periods of conflict or authoritarian 
rule (see, for example, Annan, 2004; Gready, 2011; Lai, 2016). This toolkit frequently 
comprises some combination of trials, amnesties, truth commissions and (at least 
recommended) reparations programmes and institutional reforms (see, for example, Waldorf, 
2012; Gready and Robins, 2014). These tools, at least on the face of it, are intended to 
promote the goals of transitional justice, whether accountability, justice, truth or 
reconciliation (Annan, 2004). These goals are, however, contestable (Leebaw, 2008; Bell, 
2009). This article focuses on reconciliation. In addition to being a key concept in the politics 
of transitional justice and peacebuilding (Annan, 2004; Hamber and Kelly, 2004), 
reconciliation as an idea is intertwined with and promoted by a global politics of 
reconciliation (Renner, 2014). On the one hand reconciliation is frequently put forward as a 
desirable – or even necessary – goal in transitional justice and other attempts to address 
division and conflict in post-conflict societies. On the other hand there is a growing body of 
literature which is critical of reconciliation both in theory and in practice. Engaging with this 
literature, this article seeks to assess whether reconciliation should be promoted. It asks what 
is meant by reconciliation and what purpose reconciliation serves. The article further puts 
forward recommendations regarding avoiding the pitfalls associated with problematic 
definitions and applications of reconciliation. In this regard the article argues against 
reconciliation of the sort which is frequently promoted. 
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 First the article interrogates a number of interpretations of what reconciliation is and 
what it ought to be. A range of competing and at times opposing definitions emerge. 
Different understandings of what reconciliation is influence and are influenced by the 
different purposes these notions serve. The article discusses competing and opposing aims of 
reconciliation after the exploration of what reconciliation is. Following this, the article 
considers whether reconciliation is possible in practice. It is argued that for the promotion of 
reconciliation to be defensible it is necessary to avoid prescriptive narratives, that individual 
and collective notions of reconciliation must be distinguished and that reconciliation should 
not be promoted at the expense of other measures which may have a more substantive impact 
upon post-conflict societies. 
What is reconciliation and what is it for? 
There are a variety of competing and at times opposing conceptions of what reconciliation is 
(Schaap, 2008, pp. 250-251; Bloomfield, 2006). These include reconciliation as forgiveness 
and reconciliation as acceptance (Hamber, 2007). Moreover, different conceptions of 
reconciliation posit the concept as individual, collective or as a combination of the two 
(Borer, 2004; Bloomfield, 2006). Indeed, it has been argued that reconciliation is an empty 
universal, a ‘vague yet powerful’ social ideal that cannot be clearly defined and lacks content 
in itself (Renner, 2014, p. 267). Tristan Anne Borer notes that ‘seldom is anyone talking 
about the same thing when using the term’ (2004, p. 23). If this is to be avoided it is vital that 
attempts to promote reconciliation are clear about what reconciliation is. 
It is also worthwhile asking what reconciliation is for. This impacts upon whether it is 
worthwhile promoting reconciliation and is dependent upon what reconciliation is taken to 
be. Paul van Zyl succinctly sums up that ‘[i]t is extremely hard to embark upon initiatives 
aimed at promoting reconciliation when different political groups and individuals define 
reconciliation in different ways’ (van Zyl, 1999, p. 662). On the one hand, goals such as 
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individual or societal healing may be desirable. On the other hand, it is possible that 
reconciliation is appropriated for less desirable ends. Indeed, there is a danger that the 
supposed goals of transitional justice and peacebuilding are in practice undermined by the 
uses which reconciliation is put to.  
Drawing on Marx and Engels, Andrew Schaap argues that whilst reconciliation is not 
‘necessarily an “idea of the ruling class”... it might contingently be so’ (Schaap, 2008, p. 249; 
emphasis in original). This criticism might reasonably be extended to the challenge levelled 
at transitional justice more broadly, that even if not inherently so, it has too often facilitated 
the logic of neoliberalism (Gready and Robins, 2014, pp. 341-342). This article largely 
proceeds taking the stated aims of transitional justice at face value, that it comprises ‘the full 
range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation’ (Annan, 2004, p. 6). Nevertheless, there are good reasons to maintain 
a critical perspective on, if not scepticism of, transitional justice. A major criticism of 
transitional justice (at least as it is frequently practiced) is that its primary effect – or perhaps 
even its primary purpose – is to facilitate and normalise the functioning of markets in a 
globalised capitalist economy (see, for example, Lai, 2016; Gready, 2011, pp. 212-213). 
Stability – of a particular sort – might be the goal and priority rather than addressing the 
needs and concerns of those affected by the period of conflict (Robins, 2011; see also Bell, 
2009; Lai, 2016). It is necessary to question the purposes, forms and likely results of 
processes and mechanisms ostensibly put forward to address societal harms, conflict and 
division. Specific notions of what reconciliation is and ought to be, what reconciliation is for, 
the ways in which it might be achieved and whether this is desirable are a part of this. 
Reconciliation versus societal change 
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Despite frequently being prioritised by those affected by conflict, socioeconomic conditions 
and widespread societal change are not typically emphasised in transitional justice processes 
(Waldorf, 2012, p. 175). Some understandings of reconciliation feed into this tendency.  
In South Africa, the notion of reconciliation promoted by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) comprised both individual and collective aims (Borer, 
2004). Much of the TRC’s discourse around individual reconciliation became strongly tied to 
quasi-religious notions of forgiveness, whereas when ideas of collective reconciliation were 
deployed these were largely geared around the (potentially contradictory) notion of 
promoting national unity (Borer, 2004). The TRC’s approach, ‘claiming... a national 
singularity that supersedes past divisions’, has been criticised for facilitating a situation in 
which ‘white, or, in rare instances, black offenders, are able to return to their barricaded 
suburban homes, absolved from their complicity in the maintenance of apartheid, free to 
enjoy the benefits of historic, racist inequity’ (Farred, 2004, p. 114; see also Mamdani, 2002). 
Mahmood Mamdani has argued that South Africa’s post-apartheid transition represents an 
attempt to produce ‘reconciliation without justice’ (Mamdani, 1996). He argues that for the 
TRC: 
injustice is no longer the injustice of apartheid: forced removals, pass laws, broken 
families. Instead, the definition of injustice has come to be limited to abuses within 
the legal framework of apartheid: detention, torture, murder. Victims of apartheid are 
now narrowly defined as those militants victimised as they struggled against 
apartheid, not those whose lives were mutilated in the day-to-day web of regulations 
that was apartheid (Mamdani, 1996).  
Whereas: 
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[i]n the South African context, perpetrators are a small group, as are those victimised 
by perpetrators. In contrast, beneficiaries are a large group, and victims defined in 
relation to beneficiaries are the vast majority in society (Mamdani, 1996). 
Whilst the TRC ‘became a number one export’, since the end of apartheid ‘the gap has 
widened between this bright vision of a ‘rights paradise’ and the grim everyday social, 
economic and political realities experienced by the majority of South Africa’s citizens’ 
(Robins, 2008, p. 2). This is in part due to the promotion of the TRC’s notion of 
reconciliation at the expense of emphasis upon addressing wider societal conditions 
(Huggins, 2009, p. 336). Moreover, in South Africa, a range of alternative conceptions of 
reconciliation have been articulated: 
Certain South African parties stress that reconciliation will only occur once black 
citizens are adequately compensated for years of discrimination in the areas of health 
care, housing and education. Others argue that a preoccupation with past injustices is 
an obstacle to reconciliation, and that a unified nation can only be built by focusing on 
the future. Still others argue that the return of land from which Africans were 
forcefully removed is central to reconciliation, while some contend that the creation 
of a whites-only Volksland (homeland) for Afrikaners is the only way to ensure 
peaceful coexistence (van Zyl, 1999, pp. 662-663). 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the only reason reconciliation was agreed upon as a 
component of the post-apartheid settlement by the parties engaged in negotiations is the 
wildly different – and contradictory – ideas of reconciliation held by the African National 
Congress (ANC) on the one hand and the National Party on the other (Renner, 2014, p. 265). 
Similarly, Borer argues that ‘the question “Are South Africans reconciled” is meaningless 
unless the sense in which the questioner is using the word reconciliation is made clear’ (2004, 
p. 19; see also Matthews, 2010). Whilst the conception of reconciliation which was promoted 
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through the TRC was not quite the call to ‘let bygones be bygones’ promoted in National 
Party discourse (Norval, 1998, p. 256), neither was it strongly linked to addressing 
socioeconomic injustice or to wider societal change. This is not to say that wider societal 
change is necessarily incompatible with all notions of reconciliation. As mentioned above, 
some conceptions of reconciliation are strongly tied up with calls for societal change (see also 
Mamdani, 1996). However, as indicated by Judith Renner (2014), it may not have been 
possible for the ANC and National Party to agree on promoting reconciliation if this had been 
defined as including substantive societal change. 
It could be argued that the agreement to pursue reconciliation in spite of a lack of a 
shared definition is advantageous, allowing the idea – even if undefined – to remain central in 
negotiations and the transitional settlement. However, this position should not be accepted. 
As discussed above, various notions of reconciliation put forward in South Africa are not 
only different to each other, but are at times outright contradictory. The idea that a notion of 
reconciliation ought to be pursued even if it is undefined, or clarification of its definition is 
deferred, undermines the case for societal change as a key aspect of transition. Mamdani, for 
instance, asks ‘[i]f reconciliation is to be durable, would it not need to be aimed at society 
(beneficiaries and victims) and not simply at the fractured political elite (perpetrators and 
victims)?’ (Mamdani, 1996).  
Given the unlikelihood of a notion of reconciliation emphasising societal change 
being promoted and the good reasons for thinking widespread societal change post-apartheid 
is desirable, the question is invited as to whether it is more desirable to emphasise societal 
change than it is to emphasise reconciliation of the sort promoted by the TRC (see, for 
example, Valji, 2004). Here it is argued that this notion of reconciliation should not be 
prioritised above a number of other concerns, including societal change, in transitional justice 
settings. 
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 The approach to transitional justice taken in Rwanda is somewhat different to South 
Africa. Mamdani has suggested this model amounts to ‘justice without reconciliation’, the 
opposite of the South African case (Mamdani, 1996). Nevertheless, the Rwandan government 
claims to pursue an agenda of reconciliation. However, this is strongly linked to an 
authoritarian imposition of the government’s narrative and the denunciation – or outright 
criminalisation – of opposing positions (Waldorf, 2009; Melvin, 2012). This is a rather 
different notion to that promoted by the TRC and is much more obviously problematic. 
Indeed, it is much more difficult to find supporters of the Rwandan government’s notion of 
reconciliation than it is to find positive responses to the TRC. Nevertheless, the notion of 
reconciliation put forward by the TRC can lead to the marginalisation of calls for societal 
change in ways which parallel the impact of the notion of reconciliation put forward in 
Rwanda. The Rwandan government’s version of reconciliation represents an example of one 
group making ‘its version [of national memory] the basis of national identity’ (Norval, 1998, 
p. 255; emphasis in original). Regardless of its claim to be pursuing reconciliation, the 
Rwandan government ‘has not shown a serious commitment to healing the wounds what 
persist between either individual Rwandans or the groups that they comprise’ (Kohen et al, 
2011, p. 87). Substantive societal change is not on the agenda in part due to the imposition of 
a notion of reconciliation which excludes the questioning of the current political and 
socioeconomic paradigm (Clark, 2010).
1
 In addition to the problematic mode of its 
imposition (amounting to ‘brainwashing’ in the views of some commentators) (see, for 
example, Mgbako, 2005, p. 219; Makhunga, 2015), this conception of reconciliation should 
be opposed due to its disallowing dissent and its construction of the present societal 
dispensation as fixed and incontestable. 
Reconciliation as obscuring injustice and promoting acceptance of the status quo 
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Related to the issues discussed above is the possibility that at least some visions of 
reconciliation can serve to obscure injustice and promote acceptance of the status quo 
(Schaap, 2008). Transitional justice programmes are typically conceived as being relatively 
short term, time-bound interventions (see, for example, Waldorf, 2012). Even if this is not 
intended, the nature of common transitional justice programmes such as trials and truth 
commissions can give the impression that once these have completed their immediate tasks 
the work of justice is over. Ongoing injustice may be obscured through an insistence on the 
separation between a past period of conflict, a period of transition (during which 
reconciliation takes place) and a reconciled present. This can be the case either when official 
state narratives of reconciliation and notions of national unity are imposed, such as in 
Rwanda (see, for example, Melvin, 2012), or where questioning of (at times vague) ideas of 
what it means to be reconciled (and the importance of being reconciled) may lead to political 
or social marginalisation, such as in South Africa (Tutu, 1999; Borer, 2004; Renner, 2014; 
Madlingozi, 2007; see also Hamber and Kelly, 2016). 
Furthermore, in a number of contexts, including Latin American countries, Spain and 
Angola, reconciliation is tied up with the notion that the past ought not to be revisited and, 
perhaps, that injustices ought to be forgotten (Collins, 2008; Davis, 2005; van Wijk, 2012; 
Encarnación, 2008). In this paradigm it becomes difficult to challenge both structural 
violence rooted in the past and the legacies of direct violence. Whilst ruptures of this 
paradigm might be possible (see, for example, Collins, 2010), resistance to this is frequently 
framed in terms of reconciliation (see, for example, van Wijk, 2008, pp. 748-749; Davis, 
2008, p. 867). In Rwanda, for instance, as discussed above, reconciliation is mobilised by the 
government to ‘bolster political support, silence opposition and promote development that is 
primarily uneven’ (Melvin, 2012, p. 3). In these kinds of cases reconciliation might be seen 
as facade (Melvin, 2012). To admit to the existence of unresolved societal divisions or 
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unaddressed injustices is to break a powerful taboo (in some cases a legally enforced one) 
(Davis, 2008; Melvin, 2012). Reconciliation may be put forward as desirable or even 
necessary, yet these manifestations of reconciliation do not meaningfully address the sources 
or legacies of conflict. Indeed, mobilisation of reconciliation in the service of top down 
visions of national unity, or of forgetting, works against addressing these issues. In some 
cases at least, there is evidence that these manifestations of reconciliation are actively 
harmful in that they obscure ongoing injustices and in doing so may even contribute to the re-
emergence of conflict or worsening of divisions in society (see, for example, Buckley-Zistel, 
2006). The promotion of these versions of reconciliation ought to be opposed. 
Reconciliation as removing agency 
The promotion of particular notions of reconciliation risks removing agency from individuals 
and groups affected by conflict. This is particularly evident in cases where reconciliation is 
presented as forgiveness and in cases where reconciliation is defined in relation to a particular 
narrative of national unity. 
 There is evidence that forgiveness can be beneficial for individual victims of conflict 
and, perhaps, for society as a whole (Cehajic et al, 2008, p. 352; Tam et al, 2008). However, 
where reconciliation is taken to require forgiveness there is a serious danger of undermining 
the agency of those affected. This is especially the case when reconciliation is put forward as 
necessary for society but dependent upon individual forgiveness. Here individual victims are 
– to at least some degree – treated as a means to an end. The needs, views and preferences of 
victims are subordinated to the (supposed) needs of the collective, nation or society (Hamber 
and Wilson, 2002). This is problematic. Even if individual forgiveness is not promoted as 
necessary for societal reconciliation, agency may be removed through the promotion of the 
idea that victims ought to forgive. Here a victim fails to behave in the expected, acceptable 
manner if they are unable or unwilling to forgive. In addition to placing the responsibility for 
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addressing the impact of conflict on those who are harmed by it, this prescription serves to 
undermine the autonomy of victims and to divide them into the praiseworthy (willing or able 
to forgive) and the condemnable (unable or unwilling to forgive). Perhaps, as Oliver 
Burkeman notes in relation to the Charleston church shootings,
2
 ‘[t]o offer [forgiveness], as 
families of the victims did, can be overwhelmingly powerful. To urge others to show it, as 
various onlookers did, is about as obnoxiously bullying as it gets’ (Burkeman, 2015). 
Desmond Tutu is wrong to assert that there is no future without forgiveness (Tutu, 1999). For 
Tutu forgiveness is almost always paired with reconciliation (Tutu, 1999). Those TRC 
participants who forgive are praised for their magnanimity, whereas those who are unable or 
unwilling to forgive are largely ignored or dismissed as outliers (see Tutu, 1999). Yet, these 
victims, whether or not they appeared at the TRC, do exist (see, for example, Madlingozi, 
2007). It is important not to dismiss their concerns or to impose an agenda (for instance, one 
prioritising forgiveness as reconciliation) without the meaningful participation of victims in 
articulating what their needs are and shaping how they might be met (see, for example, 
Robins, 2011). 
 There is also evidence that retribution ‘may be just as effective at creating symbolic 
closure’ as (often forgiveness-oriented) reconciliation (Hamber and Wilson, 2002, p. 35). 
This further damages the case for pursuing reconciliation as forgiveness. Questions are 
invited with regard to why forgiveness-oriented reconciliation ought to be preferred over 
retribution. In particular, given the dangers associated with removing agency through the 
requirement to forgive, it is more difficult to make the case that reconciliation of this sort is 
inherently superior to retribution. Advocates of forgiveness-oriented reconciliation frequently 
do not take account of either the risks of this notion of reconciliation or of the possibility that 
retribution might be effective as measured against the same criteria as reconciliation (see, for 
example, Tutu, 1999). Mamdani argues, for instance, that: 
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neither recovery nor revelation (of truth) has to lead to a healing of past wounds. 
Either may just as well lead to rage on the part of victims, triggering revenge, or fear 
on the part of former perpetrators, leading to a demand for separation (Mamdani, 
1996). 
He poses a number of further questions, which cannot be easily answered by those who put 
forward reconciliation, especially forgiveness as reconciliation, as both necessary and likely 
following conflict and division. Mamdani asks: 
To what extent is the shift of focus from beneficiaries to perpetrators, and from 
victims as the majority to victims as a minority, likely to generate growing resentment 
amongst the excluded majority who understandably expect to gain from reconciliation 
and forgiveness? To what extent does a process that ignores the aspirations of the vast 
majority of victims, risk turning disappointment into frustration and outrage, creating 
room for a demagogue to reap the harvest? (Mamdani, 1996). 
If symbolic closure is one desirable outcome of reconciliation, the question is invited as to 
what else is desirable in addition to this and which notions of reconciliation, if any, can 
deliver this better than retribution. 
 Where the promotion of reconciliation is intertwined with a particular narrative of 
national unity it may also remove agency from those affected by conflict. This is the case 
both when an official narrative is imposed and when specific reconciliatory ideals are tied to 
nation-building pursued through less authoritarian means. Brandon Hamber and Richard 
Wilson, for instance, point out that ‘the mythology of nation building can have damaging 
consequences for individual survivors who are seen as “out of step” with a putative collective 
conscience’ (2002, p. 36; see also Hamber and Kelly, 2016). This is most clearly evident in 
extreme cases such as Rwanda’s authoritarian notion of reconciliation as denying ethnic 
identities and denouncing or even criminalising dissent (Waldorf, 2009; Clark, 2010). It is, 
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however, also present in other contexts, more typically viewed as benign, such as South 
Africa (Hamber and Wilson, 2002, pp. 35-37; Schaap, 2008, p. 251). Nahla Valji, for 
instance, notes that ‘the TRC, in its determined pursuit of a particular kind of reconciliation, 
was ironically silent on the issue of race’ (Valji, 2004, p. 1). Moreover, ‘the result has been a 
superficial reconciliation which denies the implications of a racist past, has left much of the 
structures of inequality intact and unaddressed and has suppressed dialogue on the persistence 
of racism in the new South Africa’ (Valji, 2004, p. 5). Brandon Hamber and Gráinne Kelly 
note a somewhat similar situation in Northern Ireland, that “although largely effective in 
halting violence”, the peace deal “has been characterized as an elite-driven agreement that 
leaves ethnic divisions in place” (Hamber and Kelly, 2016, p. 26). Indeed, 
The conventional transitional narrative seeks to deny continuities between past and 
present in order to forgo the need for a more fundamental break from previous social 
arrangements; it attempts to install moderate progress in place of qualitative 
transformation. At the limit, such a vision becomes a form of narrative fetishism, its 
version of progress built on disavowal of the ongoing production of trauma and 
inequality in the present (Rothberg, 2012a, p. 7). 
Where reconciliation is mobilised as part of such narratives, those who assert victimhood risk 
being marginalised, having their concerns dismissed and being labelled ‘bad victims’ (see, for 
example, Madlingozi, 2007). Tshepo Madlingozi, for instance, notes that in South Africa the 
Khulumani Support Group’s ongoing advocacy on behalf of their members, contestation of 
the post-apartheid settlement and opposition to the notion of reconciliation promoted by the 
TRC has led to the group (the only national victims’ organisation) being marginalised and 
attacked as spoilers of the new era of national unity (Madlingozi, 2007, pp. 119-124). 
Moreover, membership of Khulumani ‘by way of self-identification as a “victim” or 
“survivor”, as opposed to being “certified” by a state agency, contributes to affirming the 
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agency of these victims’ (Madlingozi, 2007, p. 120). In contrast, the formal criteria for 
victimhood and the notions of reconciliation – as based on individual forgiveness and 
promoting national unity – pursued through the TRC serve to exclude and disempower those 
who do not fit into these categories. Furthermore, victims of conflict frequently prioritise 
socioeconomic issues over other concerns (Waldorf, 2012, p. 175; Robins, 2011). Focusing 
transitional justice mechanisms on promoting a notion of reconciliation rather than upon 
addressing the articulated concerns or priorities of those affected by conflict risks treating 
victims as a means to an end and undermines the legitimacy of programmes intended to 
address the effects of conflict (Robins, 2011; Robins, 2013; Mamdani, 1996; Mamdani, 2002; 
Eastmond, 2010). 
Is reconciliation possible? 
It has already been mentioned that whether reconciliation is possible depends very much 
upon what is meant by reconciliation. It is certainly the case that many of the forms of 
reconciliation which are commonly promoted are highly ambitious. It is also highly 
questionable whether this ambition is ever realised. This invites the question of whether 
promoting reconciliation is a worthwhile endeavour. 
 The most ambitious claims regarding the implementation of reconciliation are 
frequently also the most difficult to measure. For instance, there is some evidence that the 
South African population views the TRC largely positively and there is evidence to suggest at 
least some if its aims were achieved (Gibson, 2005). On the other hand, there are activists, 
scholars and commentators who have been critical of the TRC and who have countered 
claims that it is generally viewed positively in South African society (see, for example, Valji, 
2004; Mamdani, 2002). Measuring the extent of reconciliation specifically is particularly 
difficult. There is frequently a gap between aspiration and the empirical (Borer, 2004, pp. 20-
21). Moreover, assessing reconciliation requires first settling on which version of 
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reconciliation is being measured, who ought to be the subject of the measurement and how 
measurements ought to be taken (Borer, 2004, p. 20; see also Bloomfield, 2006; Hamber and 
Kelly, 2004). Each of these presents a difficulty. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to 
assess the extent of reconciliation (of various sorts) in a variety of contexts. 
Societal reconciliation 
Aletta Norval points to the impossibility of full societal reconciliation (Norval, 1998, p. 261). 
She argues that ‘[s]ince full reconciliation depends upon a complete coincidence with the 
self, it by definition rules out any relation to another which prevents such self-completion’ 
(Norval, 1998, p. 261). Michael Rothberg suggests that the best that can be hoped for 
regarding societal reconciliation may be members of a society accepting that the period of 
conflict, division or atrocities occurred within their society (Rothberg, 2012b). Whilst this 
may seem to be a low bar to set, many forms of reconciliation, especially those concerned 
with society rather than individuals, are not only extraordinarily ambitious but are also rarely 
achieved (see, for example, Waldorf, 2012). Overpromising with regard to the extent to 
which reconciliation is likely to occur is in itself problematic (Waldorf, 2012, p. 179). 
Moreover, there is a danger of condemning the good for its imperfection (see, for example, 
Gready, 2010, p. 188). Norval and Rothberg may both be correct in suggesting that full 
societal reconciliation is at least tremendously unlikely and may be outright impossible 
(Norval, 1998; Rothberg, 2012b). This does not, however, mean that no elements of societal 
reconciliation can ever be achieved or that any attempts to move towards these would be a 
bad thing. There is, for instance, evidence to suggest that activities facilitating contact, trust and 
empathy between members of formerly antagonistic groups can have a positive impact on intergroup 
(rather than only interpersonal) relations (Cehajic et al, 2008). Rather than abandoning the notion 
at any aspects of societal reconciliation can be successfully promoted, a nuanced approach is 
necessary, taking account of the limitations inherent in such an undertaking as well as the 
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dangers attached to deploying ill-defined notions of reconciliation as an empty signifier 
(Renner, 2014). 
Interpersonal reconciliation 
Interpersonal reconciliation has a number of possible components. Individual forgiveness is 
one (Borer, 2004, pp. 28-29). The acceptance of living alongside one another by members of 
(previously) antagonistic communities is another (Aiken, 2010). Both of these are possible. 
Neither is certain (see, for example, Tutu, 1999; Aiken, 2010; Tam et al, 2008; Rothberg, 
2012b). Moreover, they may not be possible without significant long term intervention and 
support and may not be possible at all in all cases. Particularly with regard to individual 
forgiveness or reconciliation between specific victims and perpetrators, the danger of 
removing agency and marginalising those who do not forgive has already been discussed. 
This then leads to the question of whether the possibility of these kinds of reconciliation 
ought to be pursued when there may be little chance of success. It is argued here that 
reconciliation of a sort which requires individuals to forgive (particularly that which requires 
victims to forgive perpetrators) should not be pursued.
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In contrast, there are good reasons for thinking that interaction between members of 
previously antagonistic communities, with a view to facilitating acceptance of living 
alongside one another, is desirable. There is also evidence that, whilst this may be difficult 
and require long term intervention, that it is possible (Aiken, 2010; Cehajic et al, 2008). 
Furthermore, Nevin Aiken argues that in order for the ‘social learning’ necessary for this kind 
of reconciliation to be successful ‘sustained attempts to reduce structural and material 
inequalities and limit perceptions of inequitable power relations between former antagonists’ 
are also required (Aiken, 2010, p. 171). This points both to the dangers of attaching the 
notion of reconciliation to an oversimplified narrative of a short, time-bound transition period 
(discussed above), and to the potential need for transformative justice (either as a part of or 
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parallel to existing transitional justice measures) (Aiken, 2010, p. 171; Gready and Robins, 
2014). Indeed, a transformative justice approach may yield further lessons for debates over 
reconciliation. Advocates of transformative justice argue in favour of emphasising the agency 
of those affected by conflict and taking a longer term, more bottom-up, process-oriented 
approach than is typical in transitional justice (Gready and Robins, 2014; Evans, 2016). 
Applying this to interpersonal reconciliation suggests both the need to avoid prescription with 
regard to whether or not individuals forgive one another, and the need to support sustained 
processes if positive contact between members of previously antagonistic groups is to be 
facilitated. Moreover, when other concerns, such as socioeconomic conditions and structures 
of inequality, are prioritised by those affected (see, for example, Eastmond, 2010, pp. 11-12), 
applying a transformative justice lens suggests that promoting reconciliation ought not to be a 
priority as a matter of course. 
Conclusion: should reconciliation be promoted? 
If the question asked is simply ‘should reconciliation be promoted?’, then the answer might 
be ‘it depends’. Similarly, if the question is ‘should one be against reconciliation?’, the 
answer might be ‘not necessarily’. Neither of these questions are especially illuminating, nor 
are their answers particularly helpful. Yet these are the kinds of questions one is left with, and 
the kinds of answers which must be provided, if sufficient clarity is not provided regarding 
what reconciliation is, what it is for and whether it is likely to be achieved. The discussion 
above details a number of potentially problematic notions of reconciliation and the risks 
attached to promoting these. Circumstances under which several forms of reconciliation 
(some of which are not inherently problematic) might reasonably be achieved are also 
discussed. It is argued, however, that many of the forms of reconciliation frequently 
promoted in transitional justice should not be pursued. Furthermore, it is argued that 
reconciliation should not be prioritised in transitional justice. Three main conclusions may be 
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reached. First, reconciliation can be defined in a wide variety of potentially contradictory 
ways. Reconciliation may also be left without a clear definition (see, for example, Renner, 
2014). If the desirability or feasibility of reconciliation is to be assessed in a given context it 
must be defined clearly and carefully. Reconciliation without definition should not be 
promoted. Lack of clarity over what reconciliation is and what it is intended to achieve 
undermines attempts to address conflict and injustice. Without clear definition it is not 
possible to properly assess whether reconciliation is desirable or likely to be successful in any 
given instance (see, for example, Hamber and Kelly, 2004; Bloomfield, 2006; Matthews, 
2010). 
Related to and building on the first conclusion is the second. Several notions of 
reconciliation which have been put forward in post-conflict, post-authoritarian and divided 
societies are not desirable and should not be promoted. These include reconciliation which 
requires (rather than allows) forgiveness of perpetrators by victims, reconciliation as 
forgetting injustice and reconciliation which silences dissent (see, for example, Madlingozi, 
2007; Melvin, 2012; Davis, 2005). 
The third conclusion drawn from the above discussion is that reconciliation should not 
be prioritised over concerns which are of more importance to those affected by conflict (see, 
for example, Huggins, 2009; Robins, 2011; Robins, 2013; Eastmond, 2010). This is 
particularly the case if reconciliation is vaguely defined – in contrast to concrete demands of 
victims – or where reconciliation is defined in such a way that it is very unlikely to be 
achieved. Taking the broad aims of transitional justice at face value, as aiming to deal with 
past injustice and the legacies of societal conflict and division, transitional justice 
interventions ought to focus on addressing the needs and concerns of those affected rather 
than requiring that reconciliation (however defined) is always a key concern. Moreover, there 
is a need to take account of the limitations, shortcomings and contradictions present in 
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transitional justice (see, for example, Leebaw, 2008; Bell, 2009; Gready and Robins, 2014; 
Evans, 2016). This requires looking beyond transitional justice, at least in the forms that it is 
frequently conceived, and beyond reconciliation, when necessary. 
Notes 
1. One of the anonymous reviewers of this article raised the point that reconciliation has 
little to do with socioeconomic policies pursued in South Africa or Rwanda. This is an 
important point, which serves in some ways to underline the argument put forward in 
this piece. Notions of reconciliation which are put forward as entirely separate from 
socioeconomic conditions, and the policies which affect these, are problematic (see, 
for example, Valji, 2004; Eastmond, 2010; Lai, 2016). Socioeconomic policies may 
undermine reconciliation depending upon the kinds of policy agenda pursued and on 
what reconciliation is taken to mean. It is, therefore, important that there is clarity 
over what (if any) notion of reconciliation ought to be pursued in a given context and 
how this might be pursued through or prevented by particular social and economic 
policies.  
2. Where nine people were shot dead in an apparently racially motivated attack on the 
congregation of the historically black South Carolina church in June 2015 (see, for 
example, Phelps, 2015). 
3. This is not to say, however, that allowing forgiveness would be a bad thing, or that 
forgiveness is never possible (see, for example, Tutu, 1999; Cehajic et al, 2008). 
Rather, greater emphasis should be placed on the processes which might facilitate 
individuals’ and groups’ acceptance of living alongside one another than on 
fetishising individual forgiveness as a desired outcome. 
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